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11 Introduction
The upward trend in inequality that has taken place in the United States and other coun-
tries since the 70s has generated a renewed interest in problems associated with earnings
inequality. The trend towards allocating high and low skilled workers into separate ﬁrms is
perceived as a key element to understand earnings dispersion.
In this paper we study phenomena such as workers’ ﬂows, skill segregation, within and
between ﬁrms wage dispersion as market equilibrium outcomes in environments with no skill
complementarities in production. Instead, we assume that preferences of workers depend
not only on their compensations, but also on that of their co-workers. This assumption is
consistent with a wide body of evidence showing that preferences of individuals between
allocations do not depend only on their own material well-being. Rather, the actions and
material allocations of other individuals impact directly a person’s utility, and are thus taken
into account when making a decision.
We consider a labor market in which risk-neutral ﬁrms compete for risk-averse workers
of heterogeneous quality. The eﬃciency units of workers’ labor are perfect substitutes. That
is, some workers are more productive/skilled than others, but workers of diﬀerent skills
are perfectly substitutable in some ﬁxed proportions. Firms compete by oﬀering long-term
contracts. The ﬁrms can commit to the contracts, but the workers can always accept external
oﬀers.1 The quality of the workers is not perfectly observable ex-ante but their performance
over time slowly reveals (with some noise) this quality. The workers have “social preferences,”
that is, their ﬁnal utility is aﬀected by that of others. But which others? Most standard
models of social preferences focus on two or three person games between an employer and
one or two employees. But in a model of a market, the range of interpersonal comparisons
of utility is an important consideration. We assume that these comparisons do not span the
whole population, but only individuals who work in the same ﬁrm, and have similar career
histories within the ﬁrm. For any given worker and period, we call his reference group the
set of individuals over whom his social preferences’ comparisons take place in that period.
With the structure of our model, and the traditional “selﬁsh” preferences, the equilibria
would not make a prediction on the distribution of skill levels by ﬁrm or location. Any
distribution would be consistent with equilibrium. Our ﬁrst result is that in the absence of
frictions and with social preferences, of however small strength, the equilibrium becomes skill
1For example, workers cannot post a bond, which would enforce the commitment to stay in the current
ﬁrm.
2segregated, that is, ﬁrms hire only from one skill pool.2 The externality driving segregation
is diﬀerent than the one in models of say, racial segregation. We deal here with a pecuniary
externality, that is, high-skilled types do not separate from low-skill types because they
intrinsically dislike them. They do it, rather, because the market tends to produce diﬀerent
material payoﬀs for both.
Real markets are not perfectly frictionless, though. We introduce a particularly simple
form of friction, moving (or hiring and training) costs, which produces additional implica-
tions on labor market outcomes. When moving costs between ﬁrms are low, heterogeneous
productivities lead to widespread workplace skill segregation, and the whole market wage
dispersion is explained by diﬀerences between ﬁrms. With intermediate levels of mobility
costs, segregation is more moderate and wage dispersion arises both within and across ﬁrms.
For high levels of moving costs the whole wage dispersion is within the ﬁrm, and becomes
zero when the moving costs are suﬃciently high. We show that within ﬁrm wage disper-
sion is associated with “internal labor market” features such as a dynamic form of wage
compression, gradual promotions, and wage non-monotonicity.
These results arise from an interplay between risk preferences, social preferences and
market competition. We examine these mechanisms separately.
We ﬁrst discuss the implications in our model of the combination of risk preferences
with our commitment structure. When there are neither social preferences nor frictions,t h e
equilibrium labor contracts are as in Harris and H¨ olmstr¨ om (1982), that is, wage payments
are constant over time for a given observational type (for insurance reasons), and they change
when the observational type changes. The presence of frictions in the market implies (in the
absence of social preferences) that, when higher types are revealed, their wage changes less
than in the absence of such frictions. Because of these frictions, workers remain employed
with the ﬁrm that ﬁrst hires them.
Next, we consider the eﬀect of social preferences and frictions. As before, the frictions
make it costly for workers to move between ﬁrms when their types are revealed. On the
other hand, competitive pressure forces wages to be diﬀerent for diﬀerent (perceived) skill
types. Thus, if workers of diﬀerent types (who receive diﬀerent wages) stay together, social
preferences generate a loss in utility for some of them. To compensate for the disutility, the
ﬁrm can increase the wages of the lower types.3 The ﬁrm can also modify the composition of
2In a sense we can argue that social preferences operate here as a kind of “equilibrium-reﬁnement.” The
advantage of this way of reﬁning equilibria is that the payoﬀ perturbation is economically and empirically
well-motivated.
3Because of competitive pressures, there is no room to decrease wages for the higher types.
3its workforce by letting some of the current workers leave and thus achieve a more homoge-
nous (in terms of perceived skills) workers’ pool. The ﬁrm now faces a trade-oﬀ between
wage compression and skill segregation, and the size of the frictions determines the optimal
solution to this trade-oﬀ.
The presence of frictions entices the market participants to ﬁnd imaginative ways around
them. In a sense, this is one of the lessons of the literature of contracting under incomplete
information. One can exploit the diverse dimensions of preferences to “extract” private
information by means of menus of contracts or nonlinear pricing.4 This happens as well
in our framework. Let us go back to the issue of the reference group for interpersonal
comparisons. Recall that the reference group is not the whole set of ﬁrm employees, but
only those that enjoyed similar circumstances in the near past. Then, gradual promotions
appear as a less blunt tool than wage compression to lower the eﬀects of social preferences.
Rather than promoting an individual as soon as he is discovered to be of a high type, we
show it is optimal to propose contracts which give a “smaller” promotion until his former
peers “forget” him, and then promote him further later in the future. By doing so, the
ﬁrm modiﬁes the intertemporal composition of the reference group of each worker in a way
that reduces the overall cost due to social preferences.5 The dynamics of wages result from
the complex interplay of the history of individual productivities, market competition and
intra-ﬁrm reference group structure.
An additional implication of assuming “time-dependent” reference groups is that wage
schedules may be non-monotonic. When some individuals’ performances have started to
diﬀer only recently from others, there is some wage compression, raising the salaries of low
types. Once the high types have disappeared from the reference group, the salary of the low
types can fall back to “normal.”
As one can readily see, social preferences produce a wide variety of eﬀects that happen in
well-speciﬁed circumstances, ranging from segregation by skill, to wage compression, gradual
promotions and non-monotonic wages. Models with this richness allow for a better empirical
ﬁt with reality (if, as we expect, social preferences of this form are indeed present). They
also suggest that labor and human resource economics can greatly beneﬁt from incorporating
behavioral factors in their standard set of tools.
4The standard example for competitive screening (see e.g. Mas-Colell, Green and Whinston 1995, p. 460)
shows that ﬁrms use the diﬀerences in cost of eﬀort (about which the ﬁrm does not care directly) to separate
the workers of diﬀerent productivity, and thus minimize the informational rents they extract.
5Because of insurance eﬀects for the high type, this gradual promotion is second-best. We show that the
ﬁrm balances this ineﬃciency with the social concerns to choose an optimal (gradual) promotion path.
4Background and related work We bring together several strands of the economics
literature.
Research on social preferences originated in large measure to give account of the growing
empirical and experimental evidence that human behavior could not be explained only by
the hypothesis of self-interested material payoﬀ maximization. For instance, contribution to
public goods is higher than would be expected under purely selﬁsh maximization.6 More
importantly from our point of view, there is vast amounts of evidence that people reject
lopsided oﬀers in ultimatum bargaining games.7 Several models have been proposed to
account for these observations,8 and we refer to the excellent surveys of Sobel (2000) and
Fehr and Schmidt (2000b) for a discussion. A feature that many of the models share is that
individuals dislike payoﬀ inequality. One innovation with respect to this literature is that we
think explicitly about the set of individuals to which the utility comparisons apply. In our
paper, the reference group for comparisons is a product of the collective employment history.
Workers identify less with superiors than with co-workers at their same level or recently
promoted. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) also relate identity with incentive problems. In their
case, the agents identiﬁcation with a particular group gives them an incentive to exert eﬀort,
in a moral-hazard context. For us, the identiﬁcation with a reference group creates disutility
for individuals who earn less than the average in their reference group.
A few papers examine the implications for wages and the labor market of social prefer-
ences. Frank (1982) in his seminal paper showed that workers need not be paid their marginal
productivity if people had preferences such that they cared suﬃciently strongly (and in a
heterogeneous way) about relative payoﬀs, liking to be better paid than others, and dislik-
ing to be paid worse. The more productive people would be paid less than their marginal
productivity as they got the “pleasure” of earning more than their colleagues. Similarly,
the less productive people would be paid more than their marginal productivity so as to be
compensated for the “suﬀering” of earning an inferior wage.9 In our paper we add a dynamic
6See Ledyard’s (1995) survey on public goods in the Handbook of Experimental Economics.
7See G¨ uth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982) and also Roth’s (1995) survey on bargaining in the
Handbook of Experimental Economics.
8Bolton (1991), Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), Bolton and Ockenfels (1999), Fehr and Schmidt (2000a),
Charness and Rabin (2002).
9Frank (1985) discusses many practical implications of this basic framework, such as the puzzling om-
nipresence of minimum wages, safety regulations, forced savings for retirement and other labor market
regulations. These can be explained with his model as a way to compensate for the externality that is gen-
erated by the social preferences. Other papers which deal with contracting problems and social preferences
are Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2001), Fershtman, Hvide and Weiss (2003) and Rey-Biel (2002).
5dimension to the contracting problem. This allows us to discuss issues such as promotions,
worker ﬂows and the evolution of wages, which widens the span of testable implications.
Besides, this is probably the ﬁrst model to characterize long-term contracts in the presence
of social preferences in a competitive labor market.
There is also evidence that ﬁrms workforces are more homogenous than simple “ran-
dom matching” would suggest. People of diﬀerent skill levels sort themselves into diﬀerent
ﬁrms. For instance, Kramarz, Lollivier and Pel´ e (1996) ﬁnd that specialization10 increased
massively in France between 1986 and 1992.11 Davis and Haltinwanger (1991) note that
the continuous rise in wage inequality in the U.S. is imputable in part to ability sorting
of workers across ﬁrms. Brown and Medoﬀ (1991) investigate explanations for wage-size
diﬀerentials, and ﬁnd evidence in support only for explanations based on sorting by worker
skill. Theoretical explanations for this evidence usually resort to the introduction of some
form of complementarities between individuals of the same skill levels.12 We depart from
this by not postulating any form of production complementarities between worker’s types.
The externality that arises between workers is of a pecuniary nature. It arises because mar-
ket outcomes favor more productive workers, and individuals are averse to inequalities in
their own reference group.13 Besides, our model suggests that the time-series evidence on
skill segregation can be related to changes in labor market regulations (and organizational
features) that aﬀect mobility costs.
Bewley (1999) oﬀers direct evidence for the kind of externality we postulate. Some
78% of the businesspeople whom he asked about internal equity, say that it is important
for internal harmony and morale.14 Morale meant “cooperativeness, happiness or tolerance
of unpleasantness, and zest for the job.”15 Section 6.5 in Bewley (1999) has a number of
10They compute a measure of specialization for diﬀerent professional categories as proposed by Kremer
and Maskin (1996).
11“Blue collar unskilled workers are more and more separated from other types of workers, and therefore,
tend to work together in the same ﬁrms. This is true for each of the six categories of skills. The number
even doubled for clerks.” Kramarz et al. (1996), p. 375.
12Good examples of these explanations are de Bartolom´ e (1990), B´ enabou (1993), Kremer and Maskin
(1996) and Saint-Paul (2001). The theoretical papers of Legros and Newman (2002, 2004) identify the
minimal conditions for such positive sorting.
13There are other models of segregation which rely on group externalities. Seminal works in this area
are Becker (1957) and Schelling (1971). Contrary to our paper, in that literature the individuals have an
intrinsic like or dislike of workers in their or other groups. In our case, the spillover is related only to the
market outcome. High and low types would live happily together if wages were equal.
14Bewley (1999), table 6.5.
15Bewley (1999) p. 42.
6revealing quotes from managers about the disruptive eﬀects of lack of equity on the job.16
He also shows that an important consequence of internal inequity in ﬁr m si st u r n o v e r , 17 just
as our model would predict.
We also predict that social preferences lead to wage compression.B yt h i s ,w em e a nt h e
diﬀerences in wages between workers of diﬀerent perceived skills is lower with than without
social preferences.18 The evidence given in the literature for wage compression is often
indirect. The ratio between, say, the lowest 10th percentile and the highest 90th percentile
of the wage distribution has undergone dramatic variation over time, and is quite diﬀerent
between countries, in a way that is hard to justify from purely technological reasons.19
The study of Cannon, Fallick, Lettau and Saks (2001), which directly compares wages and
productivity, shows that wage compression may arise, as in our model, “from the value
workers place on relative pay,” (p. 3). On the other hand, Hibbs and Locking (2000) show
that within plant and within industry wage leveling adversely aﬀected productive eﬃciency
in Sweden. This contradicts an explanation of wage compression as the result of ﬁrms trying
to enhance the morale of workers, thus achieving higher productivity, as in Akerlof and Yellen
(1990), but it is still consistent with our approach.
Section 2 describes the dynamic labor market model. Section 3 presents the recursive
formulation of the problem and states the equivalence with the market game in Section 2.
All results are gathered in Section 4. Appendix A describes the recursive formulation in
its most general form, and establishes the equivalence between the market game in Section
2 and the simpliﬁed recursive formulation in Section 3. The proofs of the results stated
in Section 4 are in Appendix B. Appendix C contains an exhaustive analysis of the value
function of our model.
2M o d e l
Time is discrete and indexed by t =1 ,...,T < ∞.
16¿From “Internal equity is very important,” to “Inequity causes disharmony” and even “Unfairness can
cause upheaval within an organization and lead to disfunctional activities.”
17Bewley (1999), table 6.5.
18Another model predicting wage compression in the presence of mobility costs is Acemoglu and Pischke
(1999). They show that wage compression is a necessary condition for ﬁrms’ investment in general training.
Acemoglu (1999) relates wage compression to search frictions.
19Classic references in this context are Katz and Murphy (1992) or Goldin and Margo (1992).
7Firms There is a ﬁnite set Mt of risk-neutral ﬁrms who enter the market and post an
oﬀer at any period. For simplicity, and w.l.o.g.,20 we assume that the Mtsa r ed i s j o i n t ,s o
that Mt = ∪t
s=1Ms is the set of ﬁr m st h a th a dt h ec h a n c et om a k ea no ﬀer at some date
prior to t.
Firms that are active in the market collect proﬁts at the end of each period. Firms
discount at zero interest rate.
Workers and timing Workers are risk averse and live for T periods.
There is a continuum of workers in [0,1] of two diﬀerent types, g(ood) workers and b(ad)
workers. Workers g produce one unit of output per period with i.i.d. probability p (and
zero otherwise), while workers of type b have no chance of producing good outcomes (their
production is always zero). We denote by λ ∈ (0,1) the number of workers of type g in the
population. Information about workers’ types is imperfect but symmetric, as in Harris and
H¨ olmstr¨ om (1982).
In each period t the timing of payment is as follows. The worker decides wether to stay
in the ﬁrm or accept an outside oﬀer. If the worker decides to stay in the ﬁrm, he receives
the wage from his employer.21 He then produces (thereby possibly revealing his type). This
new information is then used at the beginning of the next period by the entrant ﬁrms (the
market) to make job oﬀers and by the old ﬁrm to pay t +1w a g e st a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h e
labor market pressure.
Worker assignment At each period t, the mapping ft :[ 0 ,1] → Mt ∪{0} keeps track
of the assignment of workers to ﬁrms. The case ft(i) = 0 corresponds to worker i being
unemployed.
Whenever a worker changes ﬁrm he pays a ﬁxed mobility cost k ≥ 0. This can be
interpreted as a moving or hiring cost.
Outputs and types Firms learn about the workers’ types by observing production
outcomes of each period.
Consider some worker i ∈ [0,1]. Let yi
t =1i fw o r k e ri generates a positive output at t
(thus revealing he is of type g), and yi
t = 0, otherwise. We set yi
0 =0 .
The quality of the worker is a crucial state variable of this problem. Let qi
t be the belief
that a worker i is of good type at beginning of period t. By Bayes’ rule, next period’s quality
20Indeed, we assume that ﬁrms’ oﬀers commit them for future periods.
21We will see that, for insurance purposes, the worker may, in fact, receive (severance) payments from
earlier employers as well.
8value is qi
t+1 =1i fyi





t (1 − p)
qi




t = 0, with initial condition qi
1 = λ for all i.22
Contracts and contract oﬀers A long term contract speciﬁes a sequence of non-
negative payments contingent on observed history which includes worker-ﬁrm assignments,









s=1 be the agent i’s individual history at the beginning
of period t, after period t employer has been chosen. Let H be the set of all conceivable
histories. For all s ≥ t,d e n o t eb yH (ht;s) the set of histories starting from node ht (including
node ht)u n t i lp e r i o ds. In our model, individuals are identiﬁed with their histories. Let
(ht\ft)=( ht−1,y t−1,q t) be a shorter notation for history ht without specifying the worker-
ﬁrm assignment at period t.
Deﬁnition 1 Af e a s i b l ec o n t r a c to ﬀer W
j




s=t of mappings wj
s : H (ht;s) × [0,1] → IR + such that, for all i ∈ [0,1] and hs ∈
H (ht;s),w
j
s,i (hs) is the wage paid in period s ≥ t to worker i. Moreover, we assume that
if hi
t = hi 




s,i (·), for all s ≥ t.
Notice that we assume that ﬁrms cannot post contracts oﬀers that depend on the identity
of the worker per se, but we allow them to depend on each past worker’s employment history.
From now one, and to simplify notation, we thus omit the worker index in the payment
schedules.
At each period, all ﬁrms simultaneously post feasible contracts, taking as given previous
oﬀers.
Then, workers simultaneously decide whether to accept any new contract, to remain with
the current employer at the previously agreed contract, or to go unemployed.
At each period t there will be old contract in place as well. When j ∈ Ms for some s<t ,
then W
j
t (ht\ft) simply denotes the continuation of the contract W j
s after node ht.U n e m -







t=1,...T be the whole set of contract oﬀers.
22This stochastic structure of types implies that q = 1 is an absorbing state. This way we simplify the
nature of contracts but the intuition carries over with a richer stochastic structure.
9Workers’ strategies Worker-ﬁrm assignments are determined by workers’ decisions
in any period. We represent the choice of worker i by a sequence of functions F i
t (·)o ft h e
form Fi
t : H (ht\ft) → Mt ∪ {0}.D e n o t eb y Fi = {F i
t (·)}
T
t=1 a complete sequence of such
functions, which completely describes worker i’s choice.
These functions are essential in generating individual histories. Consider such a sequence.
Then, according to this sequence, at period 1, worker i goes to ﬁrm f1 (i)=F i
1 (0,λ)a n d
the resulting individual history is hi
1 = {∅}∪(0,λ,f 1 (i)).23 Then, production yi
1 takes place,
and ﬁrms update their beliefs to qi
2 at the beginning of period 2. The ﬁrm assignment f2 (i)






2), and so on
until period T. Notice that since the unemployment oﬀer is always in place, each worker’s
decision function F i
t (·)i sw e l ld e ﬁned at each node.
Denote by F = {Fi (·)}i∈[0,1] the whole set of workers’ assignment sequences.
Workers’ (social) preferences Notice that the set of contract oﬀers W generate







Let w ={wt (·)}
T
t=1 be a set of “total wage” functions.
In addition to the utility they obtain from their own wage −their material payoﬀs−
workers also experience (dis)utility from the material payoﬀso fﬁrm mates in their reference
group. More precisely, if we let wt (ht) be the worker wage at node ht,h i si n s t a n t a n e o u s
utility at period t is:
u(w(ht)) − A(wt (ht) − wt (ht)),
where wt (ht)i st h em a x i m u mo fht’s ﬁrm mates’ wages in his reference group and A(·)i s
the function expressing the aversion to inequity.
We assume that A(·) is zero-valued for x ≤ 0, non-decreasing for x>0, continuously
diﬀerentiable with A (0) = 0, and convex. For instance, A(x)=αmax{x,0}
p , with p>1
and α ≥ 0. Under these conditions, i experiences a disutility if and only if ht’s co-workers
highest wage is higher than his own.24 The material payoﬀ is described by a strictly concave
and diﬀerentiable utility u.
23R e c a l lt h a t ,b ya s s u m p t i o n ,hi
0 = ∅,y i
0 =0 ,and qi
1 = λ for all worker i.
24Technically, this is an extreme version of diﬀerence aversion models such as Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)
and Fehr and Schmidt (2000a). There are other models of social preferences were agents care about the
actions of others (reciprocity). See, for example, Levine (1998) and Charness and Rabin (2002).
10We assume that the reference group of worker ht at period t corresponds to the set of
ht’s co-workers of same type than ht at period t − 1. In other words, the reference group
is not the whole set of ﬁrm employees, but only those that enjoyed similar circumstances in
the near past.25














where qt−1 is the quality of worker ht in period t−1a n dft and f 
t are the period t employer
of worker ht and h 
t respectively (that is, the last entries in ht and h 
t). Then, if Rt (ht)h a s
positive mass we have






which deﬁnes a max wage schedule relevant for social preferences. We assume that wt (ht)=
wt (ht)e a c ht i m eRt (ht) has zero mass (including, obviously, the case when Rt (ht)=ht).
In equilibrium, rational agents compute the max wage function wt (·) using contract oﬀers
W and allocation rules F.L e t¯ w = {wt (ht)}
T
t=1 be the set of such max wage functions.
Given a w and a ¯ w, by choosing a set of assignment decision rules F workers assign a
lifetime utility value to each node ht\ft in the usual way:
Ut (ht\ft,F;w, ¯ w)=E
 T−t  
n=0
u(wt+n(ht+n)) − A(¯ wt (ht+n) − wt(ht+n)) | ht
 
. (5)
Notice that the expectation operator is always well deﬁned since F speciﬁes history ht which
follows node ht\ft, even for nodes which are non consistent with F. When the other ar-
guments are unambiguously deﬁned we will denote by Ut (ht) a function which associates
lifetime a utility value to each node ht ∈ H.L e tU ={Ut (·)}
T
t=1 be a set of such functions.
Deﬁnition 2 (Equilibrium) An equilibrium outcome is a tuple [W,F,U,w, ¯ w] with the
following properties:
(i) Proﬁt maximization: W is such that, given the assignment F, and W\ { W
j
t (ht\ft)},
each new ﬁrm j ∈ Mt maximizes its expected proﬁts at W
j
t (ht\ft);
(ii) Optimal assignment: F is such that each worker i maximizes his lifetime utility (5) at
Fi taking as given w and ¯ w ;
25More generally, we could have assumed that the reference group of worker i at period t is equal to the
set of i sc o - w o r k e r so fs a m et y p et h a ni at periods t − 1t ot − r (for some ﬁxed r), with possibly diﬀerent
weight for each group. This extension would considerably enlarge the state space, but all our results will
hold with this more general speciﬁcation as well.
11(iii) Rational Expectations: w and ¯ w are computed from W, F using (2), and (3) and (4),
respectively.
The optimal assignment strategies F can be constructed backward as follows. Recall
that fT−1 (i)i st h eﬁrm that employed worker i at period T −1. Let hT\fT be a last period
node before ﬁrms make oﬀers. At each such node, the worker decides to remain inside the
ﬁrm or to leave by joining a competitor. Formally, worker i solves:
max
ρ∈{0,1}
ρUT (hT−1,q T,f T−1)+( 1− ρ)U
m
T (hT\fT).
where ρ = 1 (resp. ρ = 0) stands for staying in (resp. leaving) the current ﬁrm. The
expression Um
T (hT\fT) corresponds to the best market oﬀer, that is:
U
m
T (hT\fT)= s u p
j =fT−1(i),j∈Mt∪{0}
U1 (hT−1,q T,j ).
At equilibrium, fT (i)=fT−1 (i) if and only if ρ∗ = 1. Otherwise, the identity fT (i)o ft h e
new employer coincides with any of the best market oﬀers available.26
3 Optimal contracts: a recursive formulation
In this section we show that the equilibrium allocation can be characterized recursively. This
is so because ﬁrms’ full commitment and the possibility of paying severance payments make
the equilibrium constrained eﬃcient.
For this purpose, we begin by formulating a recursive constrained optimization problem.
First, we deﬁne the optimization problem for the last period. This is of course required
because our setting has a ﬁnite time horizon. Besides, the last period formulation allows us
to discuss with detail the constraints of the problem. Then, we present the general recursive
expression. Finally, we show that the equilibrium of our game coincides with the solution of
this optimization problem.
We ﬁrst introduce some useful notations.
Good workers Consider some worker i that is known to be good at the beginning of
time t (that is, qi
t = 1). Then, from period t+1 on, the reference group of worker i includes
only workers’ of good type. That is, for s ≥ t +1 ,o n l yw o r k e r sj with qj
s =1a r ei nh i s
reference group, and he is only in the reference group of such workers. Because of this and
given our deﬁnitions of social preferences, there are no externalities across these workers and
26Ties are broken randomly.
12any other any more. Thus standard arguments imply that market competition and worker’s
risk aversion produce for all s>tequilibrium wages for these workers that are equal across
periods and production realizations (for insurance reasons), and across workers.
Workers of yet unknown type Consider a ﬁrm f designing the contingent payments
to be eﬀective at the end of period t. Workers that were not working in f in the previous
period do not belong to the reference group for workers already in f at t−1a n dv i c ev e r s a .
Thus, their contracts can be treated separately from the point of view of ﬁrm f. Similarly,
as we argued before, workers i with qi
t−1 = 1 can be treated separately as well.
Thus we only need to focus on the characteristics of contracts for workers with qi
t−1  =1 ,
and who were employed in ﬁrm f at t−1. We denote by wgt (respectively, wut) the wage of
such a worker when yi
t = 1 (respectively, yi
t = 0). It follows from our deﬁnition that these
payments are independent of the identity i of the worker and that of his employer f.
The recursive formulation: last period Whenever no confusion is possible, and to
simplify notations, we use letters without times u b s c r i p t st od e n o t ec h o i c ev a r i a b l e s .
We consider ﬁrst the ﬁrms’s problem in the last period (at date T − 1). Let q be the
average quality of the current pool of workers within the same reference group (agents who
had the same past history till the last period and enrolled in the same ﬁrm). Denote by π
the proﬁts the ﬁrm makes out of this group. If we denote by VT(π,q)t h eex-ante (before
production of the previous period realizes) utility of a worker who belongs to this poll. We
have:
VT(π,q)= m a x
wu,wg,ρ pqu(wg)+( 1− qp)[u(wu) − ρA(   w(q))]
subject to




  w(q)=wg − wu [α]
u(wu) − ρA(   w(q)) ≥ u(pqu − k)[ u]
u(wg) ≥ u(p − k)[ g]
pq(p − wg)+( 1− pq)(pqu − wu) − (1 − ρ)min{pq,1 − pq}k ≥ π [π]
We comment on this optimization problem.
Equation [q] is the Bayes’ rule (1) for the average quality of the workers of still unknown
type.
Equation [α] computes the diﬀerence between the wage wu of workers of unknown type in
the ﬁrm and the workers of good type. This diﬀerence is the source of the social preferences
13disutility (thus, cost for the ﬁrm).
Equations [u]a n d[ g] are the participation constraints of, respectively, workers of type u
and g. The left-hand side is simply the utility of accepting the proposed contract. The right-
hand side is the utility derived from the market wage. This market wage results from the
zero-proﬁt condition for the highest bidding entrant. More precisely, we know that workers






u is the market wage. However, since these workers must pay the moving cost k we
can assume that this cost is transferred to the ﬁrm. Thus, ﬁrms’ proﬁts are equal to k and
workers’ net earnings are w∗
u − k = pqu − k. Similarly, the market wage of type g workers
is such that p − w∗
g =0 , and net earnings are w∗
g − k = p − k. Notice that since qu < 1t h e
right hand side of [g] will always be larger than the right hand side of [u]. This is why good
workers will never be aﬀected by social preferences.
We now explain the constraint [ρ]. In our context, ﬁrms oﬀer long-term contracts and
face competition by entrants. Thus, a ﬁrm who keeps workers of the same type together faces
a cost due to workers’ social concerns. On the other hand, ﬁrms are somewhat shielded from
competition (thus pay slightly lower wages) because of the moving costs that a competitor
needs to pay in order to steal new workers. Hence, keeping workers in the ﬁrm is a matter of
choice, and the probability of keeping the worker ρ models this choice. The main trade-oﬀ
here is between the cost (higher wages) generated by social concerns and the beneﬁt( l o w e r
wages) arising from the hiring cost. In principle, a ﬁrm might want to let go either the good
types, or the unknown types, or both, depending on the circumstances.27 We show in the
appendix that the ﬁrm always ﬁres the workers from the smaller-sized pool (either the good
or those of yet unknown type), and thus one can formulate the problem with only one ρ,
that keeps track of whether somebody is ﬁred at all.
Equation [π] guarantees that, with the proposed wage contract, the ﬁrm can secure
expected proﬁts at least equal to π.
The recursive formulation: the general case Let Vt(π,q)b et h eex-ante utility of a
w o r k e rw h ob e l o n gt oar e f e r e n c eg r o u po fa v e r a g eq u a l i t yq, when the employer is expecting
to make an ex-ante level of proﬁts equal to π when there are T − t ≥ 0 periods before the
27For example, the cost due to social concerns varies with workforce composition. By taking diﬀerent
decisions as to which type of workers leave, one can modify the workforce composition and, thus, change
this cost.
14end. Obviously, VT ≡ 0, in general we have:















  w(q)=wg − wu [α]
u(wu) − ρA(   w(q)) + Vt+1(πu,q u) ≥ V m
t (k,qu)[ u]
u(wg)+Vt+1(πg,1) ≥ V m
t (k,1) [g]














is the maximal utility obtainable in the market by a pool of workers of quality q. Hence, for
good workers (q =1 )w eh a v e :
V
m










It is easy to see that the problem for good workers is fully stationary. In this case the market
contract consists of a constant wage w∗
t,g = p− k
T+1−t. Indeed, when q = 1, there is no further
heterogeneity in the pool, and hence Vt(π,1) = V m
t (π,1) for all π,t .Then, Vt(π,1) is a











which leads to the expression for the wage.
The equivalence result The following result guarantees that we can solve for an
equilibrium of the game in Section 2 by characterizing the solution to the optimization
problem deﬁned above. Besides, existence of the equilibrium is guaranteed.
Proposition 1 (recursive equivalence) An equilibrium of the game described in Section
2 always exists. Let the policy functions O(0,λ)={wt,πt,πz,t,w z,t,ρt}z=g,u;t=1,..,T and the
28See Appendix C.
15value functions V(0,λ)={Vt,Vm
t }t=1,..,T be a solution to the maximization problem de-
scribed in Section 3 when π1 =0and q1 = λ. Then, in any undominated equilibrium
[W,F,U,w, ¯ w] o ft h eg a m et h ew a g eo ﬀers, ﬁrm-worker assignments and payoﬀso fa l l
workers (except for at most a measure zero set of them) are given by O(0,λ) and V(0,λ).
At this equilibrium, the ex-ante utility of a worker belonging to a reference group of
average quality q is E[Ut (ht) | ht−1]=Vt(π,q).
4 Optimal contracts: the results
4.1 The case without social preferences
We aim to understand the eﬀect of social preferences on the allocation of workers to ﬁrms
and on the wage proﬁles. For this purpose we ﬁrst describe the predictions of our model in
the absence of social concerns, that is, when A ≡ 0. In this case, the model extends Harris
and H¨ olmstr¨ om (1982) (HH hereafter) to a setting with mobility costs, k ≥ 0. The case
when k = 0 is a discrete support of human capital levels version of HH.
Proposition 2 (no social preferences) Assume that there are no social concerns (A ≡
0). Then:
(i) when k =0 ,t h eﬁrm-worker assignment is indeterminate;
(ii) when k>0, no worker ever leaves his initial employer, that is, ρt =1for all t;
(iii) for all k ≥ 0, the wage schedule is downward rigid, that is, wz ,t+1 ≥ wz,t for all t and
z,z  ∈ {g,u};
(iv) wages are stationary for a given type, that is, wz,t+1 = wz,t for all t and z ∈ {g,u}.
For very large levels of k, the market pressure is so low that the ﬁrm can fully insure
the workers and pay them their expected productivity each period, i.e. wt (ht)=λp for
each equilibrium history ht. For more moderate levels of moving costs (including k =0 )
the model generates monotone (downward rigid) wages. In period 1 each worker is paid less
than his expected productivity and the wage remains constant until the worker is revealed
to be good. When the worker’s type is revealed, he will be approached by an external ﬁrm,
and his wage within the original ﬁrm must increase to match the market oﬀer. His wage
remains constant from that period onwards. Notice that when k>0, there are neither quits
nor layoﬀs, and when k =0 , worker ﬂows are indeterminate.
164.2 The case with social preferences and without mobility costs
¿From now on we will consider the case that there are social preferences, that is, A(x) strictly
increasing when x>0. When k =0 , we have a full segregation result, i.e. there will be no
workers’ heterogeneity within the same ﬁrm, and all wage dispersion is between ﬁrms.
Proposition 3 (skill segregation) If k =0 , then ρt =0 , for all t, that is, ﬁrms hire from
only one skill pool. Hence wage dispersion within the ﬁrm is zero, but overall wage dispersion
is maximal and identical to the case without social preferences described in Proposition 2 (with
k =0 ) .
In the absence of mobility costs, segregating the workforce saves on the pecuniary ex-
ternality created by competitive pressures and the presence of social concerns within ﬁrms.
In other models which produce segregation, this is driven by a direct externality over oth-
ers’ attributes.29 Agents, say, have preferences over the types of others. Here, preferences
are only indirectly aﬀected by the types of others, as the primary externality is induced
by economic outcomes (which are, in turn, shaped by diﬀerences in type productivity and
competitive pressures).
A corollary of this result is that worker compensation in this framework has the same
structure as in HH. The good type, which has completely revealed his type, receives his
expected productivity. For the other type, compensation are downward rigid and trade oﬀ
the insurance concern of the risk-averse agents with the competitive pressure. Insurance
creates a tendency to have constant wages. But since workers are free to move between
ﬁrms, the good types necessarily have to be compensated when they reveal their type. The
key diﬀerence with respect to HH is that here some workers actually leave the ﬁrm, i.e. this
model produces worker ﬂows. In addition, notice that social preferences imply that in this
extreme case all the observed wage dispersion is between ﬁrms. Within the same ﬁrm all
workers receive the same wage. Finally notice that if those who leave are not the good types,
they might be entitled to a compensation that is higher than their expected productivity.
Since the new ﬁrm does not pay a wage in excess of expected productivity, the diﬀerence is
made up by the former employer, in the form of severance payments.30
Notice that also in the case with social preferences for very large levels of k, the market
pressure is so low that the ﬁrm can fully insure the workers and pay them their expected
29Seminal works in this area are Becker (1957) and Schelling (1971).
30The presence of severance payments allows the ﬁrm to pay smaller wages during the employment period.
In this way, one can reinterpret this payment (and the lower wages in the past) as an optimal unemployment
insurance scheme (see Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997 and Pavoni 2004).
17productivity each period, i.e. wt(ht) ≡ λp.
4.3 The general case
We now consider the general case with both social concerns and mobility costs. That is we
assume that A(x) is strictly increasing when x>0, and that k>0. With respect to the
previous case (where k = 0), the introduction of frictions in the form of mobility costs creates
a trade-oﬀ between the gains in eﬃciency stemming from lower inequality when workers are
free to move between ﬁrms and the loss created by the hiring cost associated with these
m o v e s .T h ew a g es t r u c t u r ew i l ls u b s u m et h i ss o u r c eo fi n e ﬃciencies in three diﬀerent ways,
which we analyze in turn.
First, through lower intra-ﬁrm wage dispersion. When the cost of mobility is not too
small there is heterogeneity in the perceived skills within ﬁrms, which induces diﬀerential
wages because of competitive pressures. Because of social preferences workers of yet unknown
type suﬀer a loss in utility. To compensate them (thus avoiding quits to the competitors),
the ﬁrm pays them a higher wage than that they would receive in the absence of social
concerns.31 We call this eﬀect, wage compression. Thus, social concerns add a new source of
wage compression in addition to the one already derived from insurance.
More formally,
Proposition 4 (wage compression) Assume that at two successive dates with ρt+1 =1 ,
we have 0 ≤   w(qt) <   w(qt+1),t h e nwu,t <w u,t+1. In particular, when social concerns are not
active in the current period but are active next period, the next period wage for workers of
yet unknown type is larger than their wage in the current period.
The second observational implication of frictions in our model is that the reaction (in
term of wage increases) to new positive information about workers will be more gradual
than one would expect from pure market forces. We have assumed that the reference group
within which social concerns are active is composed by co-workers who recently were in
similar circumstances. An immediate reaction of wages to productivity followed by a ﬂat
wage scheme is optimal from the point of view of intertemporal smoothing of the worker
whose good type has just been revealed. This one-step wage increase is, on the other hand,
costly from the point of view of social concerns. It would be preferable to do a more gradual
increase, taking advantage of the fact that any wage increase, however small, would separate
31The higher wage for the unknown type reduces the wage diﬀerential that creates social concern. In
particular wu increases even when the constraint [u]i ss l a c k .
18the lucky worker from the reference group of the less fortunate ones. This creates the scope
for reducing the cost of inequality by making the transitions more gradual.
We call this gradual promotions. This is a qualitatively new feature of the wage dynamics,
where ﬁrms exploit an endogenous dimension of the worker’s preferences, the reference group,
which they manipulate through the reaction of wage patterns to output realizations.
Notice that −as Proposition 2(iv) shows− this feature of the wage proﬁle is generated in
our model by social preferences, i.e. it is not present in the model when A ≡ 0.
Proposition 5 (gradual promotions) If   w(qt) > 0, and ρt =1then wg,t+1 >w g,t, for a
worker revealed to be good at time t (that is, for worker i such that yi
s =0 , for all s<t ,
and yi
t =1 ). In other words, when the wage of the workers of the good type is meant to
increase because the participation constraint is binding and social concerns are active in
the current period, the wage for workers of the good type increases gradually towards their
(known) productivity.
A ﬁnal observation regarding the dynamic pattern of wages is that they do not need to be
monotone, unlike in HH, where wages are downward rigid. We ﬁnd that wages can decrease
after an expansive phase, because the reference group for wage comparison changes during
this phase, and so do the social concerns that condition the wages that are paid. We call
this wage non-monotonicity.
Proposition 6 (wage non-monotonicity) Consider three successive dates with ρt =1 ,
and both   w(qt−1) <   w(qt) and   w(qt+1) <   w(qt). Then, if constraint [u] is not binding at
period t +1 , both wu,t−1 <w u,t and wu,t+1 <w u,t. In particular, if social concerns are not
active in periods t − 1 and t +1but are active in period t, the wage increases between t − 1
and t and then decreases in period t +1 .
Notice again that this result is not present in the model with no social concerns, and that
this is a characteristic of the ﬁrst three periods of a relationship.32
5 Final remarks
This paper provides a new dynamic competitive equilibrium model of the labor market.
The presence of social concerns and mobility costs has both cross section and time series
32After the third period, the wage of the unknown type decreases as long as k>0 because of the ﬁnite
time-horizon eﬀect.
19implications for the market allocations of workers to ﬁrms, for within and between ﬁrms
wage dispersion, and for the internal wage structure of the ﬁrm.
First, social preferences generate workplace skill segregation, whose extent decreases with
mobility costs. This prediction is consistent with the widening of inter-ﬁrm wage variance
observed in the last decade (see Kramarz, Lollivier, and Pel´ e 1996 for France and Kremer and
Maskin 1996 for the U.S.). Second, social preferences and mobility costs reduce within ﬁrms’
wage variance (documented empirically by Goldin and Margo 1992, or Katz and Murphy
1992). Third, individual wage changes at the ﬁrm level are serially correlated, consistently
with the ﬁndings of Baker, Gibbs and H¨ olmstr¨ om (1994). Fourth, unlike in Harris and
H¨ olmstr¨ om (1982), wages can decrease within the ﬁrm in our model. This decreases are
correlated with reorganizations and/or absence of promotions.
The model, thus, generates a broad range of implications. Lessons drawn initially from
the experimental laboratory, once incorporated into standard models of organizations and
markets, provide new quantitative and qualitative predictions which enrich our view of how
the labor market operates.
20Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1.
The aim of this section is to establish the equivalence between the original equilibrium
problem with social preferences and workers assignment decisions (the game of Section 2) and
the recursive formulation in Section 3. We will then prove some properties of the associated
value function in Appendix C.
Proof of Proposition 1 (recursive equivalence):
The existence of an equilibrium [W,F,U,w, ¯ w] is established constructively.
First, at period t =1 , undominated contract oﬀers must be such that payments from
ﬁrm j are zero for each history h1 such that j/ ∈ f1([0,1]). Hence, we can assume that
only one ﬁrm makes non-zero payments at each h1. Then, standard arguments imply that
U1 (h1)=V m
1 (0,λ), that is, worker payoﬀs at the beginning of the game correspond to the
market threat. Indeed, if a contract oﬀer W1(0,λ) accepted in equilibrium by some worker
did not solve the following problem:
V
m










then, either the oﬀering ﬁrm would not make non-negative proﬁts (the budget constraint
above would not be satisﬁed)33,o rt h eo ﬀer would not maximize the worker’s utility, or
both. In all cases this would generate a contradiction for the following reasons. First, the
fact that an equilibrium oﬀer cannot generate negative proﬁts ex-ante is immediate from
the deﬁnition of equilibrium.34 Second, if the oﬀer W were not utility maximizing, there
would exist another oﬀer with positive proﬁts delivering a higher utility to all workers; some
competitor would make this oﬀer and attract these workers.
Consider now a history ht and consider the set of workers i for which qi
t  =1 .W ed e n o t e
by ρu,t (resp. ρg,t) the symmetric equilibrium decision of all workers i such that yi
t = 0 (resp.
33Notice that π reppresents the expected proﬁts of the ﬁrm regardless of the details of the future oﬀers.





1, if ht is such that ft(i)=j
0, otherwise
.



















t = 1). For all workers i such that qi
t =1 ,ρt = 1 is an optimal choice.
Let now consider the ex-ante utility V2(π,λ) and in general Vt (q,π), t ≥ 2. We now show
that Vt (q,π)=E[Ut (ht) | ht−1] solves the following optimization problem:
Vt (q,π)= max
w,wz,sz,ρz,πz pq {ρg [u(wg)+Vt+1 (πg,1)] + (1 − ρg)V
m
t (k − sg,1)}
+(1− qp){ρu[u(wu) − ρgA(   w(q)) + Vt+1 (πu,q u)] + (1 − ρu)V
m
t (k − su,q u)}
(Problem 1)
subject to




  w(q)=wg − wu [α]
ρu [u(wu) − ρgA(   w(q)) + Vt+1 (πu,q u) − V m
t (k,qu)] ≥ 0[ u]
ρg [u(wg)+Vt+1 (πg,1) − V m
t (k,1)] ≥ 0[ g]
and the budget constraint:
pq[ρg (p − wg + πg)+( 1− ρg)(−sg)]
+(1− pq)[ρu(pqu − wu + πu)+( 1− ρu)(−su)] ≥ π. [π]
Given a solution to this optimization problem, we construct an equilibrium [W,F,U,w, ¯ w].
Consider a history ht such that qt = 1 for some worker i (good type). Worker i’s ex-
post utility is U (ht)=u(wg)+Vt+1 (πg,1) when ρg,t = 1, and thus ft(i)=ft−1(i). It
is U (ht)=V m
t (k − sg,1) when ρg,t = 0, and thus ft(i)  = ft−1(i). Ex-post utilities for
workers with qt  = 1 (unknown type) are deﬁned similarly. The equilibrium payments wt (ht)
corresponds to wg (resp. wu)i fi nht we have qt =1( r e s p .qt  = 1) regardless of the speciﬁc
ﬁrm entry ft. And the proﬁts values are the expected proﬁts of ﬁrm ft at node ht regardless
of the details of the other ﬁrms’ oﬀers.
Clearly, when ρz =1 ,z = u,g the constraints [u]a n d[ g]m u s tb es a t i s ﬁed by the
equilibrium value of utility U (ht), since the worker maximizes at each such node. The
market values V m
t satisﬁes (6) for the same reasons given in the initial period. Notice,
indeed, that when ρz =1 ,ﬁrms other than ft make zero payments at equilibrium.
Notice ﬁrst that if the worker were never to leave after t (that is, ρg,s = ρu,s =1f o ra l l
s ≥ t, then the payments will always be made by only one ﬁrm and the equivalence between
Problem 1 and the equilibrium follows from standard arguments in the recursive contracts
literature.35
35The problem is then a simple extension of Thomas and Worral (1988). See also Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2000).
22Let’s consider now the case where the worker changes ﬁrm at t for the ﬁrst time, say
ρu,t = 0 (the case ρg,t = 0 is similar). Since ρg,t =1 , 36 by the monotonicity of V m
t in its
ﬁrst argument we have sg = 0. Hence, lifetime utility of type g w o r k e r ss o l v e st h er e c u r s i v e
problem by the argument made above for market and period 1 values.
Consider now the problem related to wu,πu and su,w h e nρu = 0. We must show that
the total wage wt (ht) received in equilibrium by a worker i with history ht = ht−1∪(0,q u,f t)
can include some payment w
j
t (ht)f r o mﬁrm j even though ft(i)  = j. We further show that
the unidimensional choice of su suﬃces to fully describe such payment.
Notice that ﬁrms do not care about the timing of payments. In particular, su may corre-
spond to a lump sum payment or to a stream of payments during multiple periods. However,
since ﬁr m st a k ea sg i v e ne x i s t i n go ﬀers when making new ones, these new oﬀers must com-
plete optimally the pre-existing payments in equilibrium. This implies that if V m
t (k,qu)
deﬁnes the maximal utility the agent can get from a market oﬀer, then V m
t (k − su,q u)m u s t
be the lifetime utility the worker can get given that ﬁrm ft−1 pays su in expected terms,
independently of the form of such payments. In equilibrium su must hence be optimally
chosen. If the stream of payments were not chosen to solve Problem 1, at the moment when
ﬁrm ft−1 made the oﬀer it would be the possible to oﬀer a better contract to the agent. This
alternative contract would typically deliver more insurance to the worker.
Notice that a solution to the recursive problem exists since all objective functions are
continuous and wage payments can be bounded below by 0 and above by 1. Proﬁts can be
bounded above by T and below by −T, so as to have a compact choice set. We now use the
optimal policy to construct an equilibrium of the game and to show simultaneously existence
and the equivalence result.
The functions wt (·), ¯ wt (·), and Ut (·) can be derived directly from the recursive formula-
tion. By construction, the proﬁt values derived by the policies are nonnegative ex-ante. We
now need to specify W, F. The proposed equilibrium starts with all workers equally distrib-
uted among M1 ﬁrms. If at some date t for some type z we have ρz,t = 0 then assume that
all leaving workers get distributed equally among new ﬁrms Mt and so on. This equilibrium
assignment can be generated by a W where all ﬁr m si nag i v e np e r i o do ﬀer exactly the same
contract, which speciﬁes zero payments for all nodes emanating from an initial node with
ft  = j, and the appropriate distribution of policies F so as to have an equal distribution
among ﬁrms. Finally, we complement the recursive policies by setting payments to zero at
all node not reached in equilibrium. It is then easy to see that such oﬀers constitute an
36We will see that ρg,t = ρu,t = 0 is never optimal as long as k>0.
23equilibrium.
We now show that this problem actually takes the form of the recursive formulation in
Section 3 by showing that through the severance payments ﬁrms internalize the wage losses
(due to the moving cost k) of the worker in case of a transition between ﬁrms. They hence
operate as planners, solving a constrained eﬃcient allocation problem.
Severance payments in the two-period case We consider ﬁrst the case where
T = 2. The equilibrium contract must maximize the agent’s equilibrium utility:
max
w,wz,sz,ρz u(w)+pq [ρgu(wg)+( 1− ρg)u(p − k + sg)]
+(1− qp){ρu[u(wu) − ρgA(   w(q))] + (1 − ρu)[u(pqu − k + su)]}
where the social concerns element is multiplied by ρg since when ρg = 0 they disappear as
t h ep o o li n s i d et h es a m eﬁrm is homogeneous. The constraints are




  w(q)=wg − wu [α]
[u(wu) − A(   w(q)) − u(pqu − k)]ρu ≥ 0[ u]
ρg [u(wg) − u(p − k)] ≥ 0[ g]
Notice that the participation constraint must be satisﬁed only when ρz = 1 and that in this
case the right hand side is such that there are no payments in the (of-the equilibrium) case
the worker left.
The budget constraint is:
pq − w + pq[ρg (p − wg)+( 1− ρg)(−sg)]
(1 − pq)[ρu(pqu − wu)+( 1− ρu)(−su)]
≥π
where it is taken into account that if ρg =0t h eﬁrm must pay a severance payment. Denote
by φπ the associated multiplier.
Now assume for example that ρu =0 . The optimal severance payment su solves
u
  (pqu − k + s
∗
u)=φπ




24H e n c ew eh a v et h a ts∗
u = w∗ − (pqu − k). Similarly, when ρg =0w eh a v et h a ts∗
g = w∗ −
(p − k). Typically, (p − k) >w ∗ hence s∗
g would be a tax but the limited commitment of the
worker will imply that s∗
g =0 .
Notice that when pq < 1 − pq for example, the two period problem can be written as
follows
V1(π,q)= m a x
wu,wg,ρg,ρu u(w)+pqu(wg)+( 1− qp)[u(wu) − ρA(   w(q))]
subject to




  w(q)=wg − wu [α]
u(wu) − ρA(   w(q)) ≥ u(pqu − k)[ u]
u(wg) ≥ u(p − k)[ g]
pq(p − wg)+( 1− pq)(pqu − wu) − (1 − ρ)pqk ≥ π [π]
where ρ = ρu.
Severance payments in the general case We now consider the general case. Our
aim is to show that Problem 1 is equivalent to the following Problem 2:















  w(q)=wg − wu [α]
u(wu) − ρuρgA(   w(q)) + Vt+1(πu,q u) ≥ V m
t (k,qu)[ u ]
u(wg)+Vt+1(πg,1) ≥ V m
t (k,1) [g ]














Proposition 7 Let w∗,w ∗
z,π∗
z,ρ∗




z =1for z = u,g. (ii) If ρ∗
u =0then the solution to Problem 1 is obtained by
25setting −su = pqu − w∗
u + π∗
u − k and (w,wu,πu)=( w∗,w ∗
u,π∗
u). (iii) If ρ∗








Notice that we haven’t contemplated the case where both ρu = ρg =0 . This is so because,
as we will show below, this situation never arises at equilibrium.
Proof. (i) is straightforward. To show (ii) notice that once −su = pqu −w∗
u +π∗
u −k the
budget constraint in Problem 1 coincides with that of Problem 2. Moreover, the objective
function both for w and wg and πg are identical in the two problems, and the remaining
constraints coincide as well. As a consequence, each solution for those variables of the ﬁrst
problem must also be a solution of the second problem. It remains to be shown that the so
deﬁned su is optimal for Problem 1. We are going to show that it satisﬁes the ﬁrst order





t (k − su,q u)=u
 (w).
where from its deﬁnition V m (k − su)s o l v e s
V
m
t (k − su,q u)=m a x
wu,πu

   
   
u(wu)+Vt+1(πu,q u)
s.t. pqu − wu + πu ≥ k − su




   
   
Notice that by construction, the problem above coincides with that faces in Problem 2 when
we have chosen w∗
u,π∗
u. Hence its solution wu,πu must in particular be such that wu = w∗
u
and πu = π∗
u. B yt h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e m ∂
∂πV m
t (k − su,q u)=u  (wu)a n df r o mt h eﬁrst order
conditions in Problem 2 we have u  (w∗)=u  (w∗
u) hence we are done. Q.E.D.
Given the expression for V m
t above, it is straightforward to see that the objective functions
of Problem 1 and Problem 2 are identical. We now show that the budget constraints are also
identical. By construction, this is trivially true for the budget constraint [π]a n d[ π ]. First,
when ρz =1 ,t h e n[ z]a n d[ z ] are identical, for z ∈ {u,g}. Second, suppose that ρz =0 .I n
Problem 1, the constraint [z] disappears. In Problem 2, the participation constraints [z ]a r e
trivially satisﬁed. Indeed, for all z ∈ {u,g},w eh a v e :
u(wz)+Vt+1(πz,q z)=V
m
t (k − sz,q z) ≥ V
m
t (k,qz),
where the last inequality derives from monotonicity of V m
t and the fact that sz ≥ 0.
26The ρ decision To get to the ﬁnal formulation of the main text we need the following
lemma.
Lemma 8 If k>0, in the optimal contract, (ρu,ρg)  =( 0 ,0).
Proof. Notice that from the objective function and the participation constraints when
ρz =0t h e nρz  =z = 1 is weakly optimal. But then from the budget constraint setting ρz  =1
is strictly optimal as long as k>0. Q.E.D.
Lemma 9 If in the optimal contract ρu + ρg =1 ,t h e ni fpq < 1 − pq then (ρu,ρg)=( 1 ,0),
if pq > 1 − pq then (ρu,ρg)=( 0 ,1).
Proof. We saw above that when ρu+ρg =1t h eo n l yd i ﬀerence for the optimal choice is
made by the budget constraint. Hence the result comes immediately since when pq < 1−pq
t h eg o o dt y p ea r et h el e s sn u m e r o u s .Q.E.D.
These results lead to the expression in the main text.
27Appendix B: Proofs of the Remaining Propositions
All proofs that follow will be based on the recursive formulation of the problem and the
diﬀerentiability of the value function. The equivalence between the sequential problem and
its recursive form it has been shown above. The properties of the associated value function
Vt are formally shown in Appendix C.
Proof of Proposition 2 (no social preferences). (i)-(ii) Are straightforward. (iii)-
(iv) Are the key results in HH, whose proof fully applies here. Here is the formal proof. In
the absence of social concerns, the problem can be written as follows:
Vt(π,q)= m a x
wu,wg,ρ,πu,πg (1 − pq)[u(wu)+Vt+1(πu,q u)] + pq [u(wg)+Vt+1(πg,1)]
subject to




u(wu)+Vt+1(πu,q u) ≥ V m
t (k,qu)[ u]
u(wg)+Vt+1(πg,1) ≥ V m
t (k,1) [g]
pq(p − wg + πg)+( 1− pq)(pqu − wu + πu)) − (1 − ρ)min{pq,(1 − pq)}k ≥ π, [π]
(i) It is clear from constraint [π]t h a ta sl o n ga sk>0, ρ =1 . (ii) When k =0 , and again
from [π], any retention decision ρ ∈ {0,1} is optimal. As a result, the market assignment
of workers to ﬁrms is indeterminate. (iii) Now take the ﬁrst order conditions and use the









for z = u,g, (7)
where φz is the Lagrange multiplier associated to constraint [z]. Since φz ≥ 0w a g e sa r e
weakly increasing as stated in the ﬁrst part of (iii). To see the second part of the statement,
notice that the right hand side in [u] decreases with t. Hence φu,t =0f o ra l lt and the result
follows from the ﬁrst order conditions. That is, a constant wage (as required by insurance
motives) also solves the participation constraint. (iv) When in (7) φg > 0, we might have an
increase in wage. However, once the type is revealed the problem for these workers becomes
stationary. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3 (skill segregation). When k = 0 the participation con-
straint [g] is always binding (otherwise the ﬁrm could not make zero ex-ante proﬁts) hence
setting ρt = 1 will induce social concerns. Setting ρt = 0 increases the objective function
and relaxes constraint [u]. Q.E.D.
28Proof of Proposition 4 (wage compression). In appendix C we show that, despite
the fact that the function is not always diﬀerentiable or concave, we can without loss of gener-
ality restrict attention to diﬀerentiable points. We can hence apply the (local-diﬀerentiable)
Kuhn-Tucker theorem to show existence and non-negativity of the multipliers.37
We will focus on interior contracts. The necessary conditions for an interior optimum are
(recall that
∂A (  w(qt))
∂wu,t = −A  (   w(qt))) :
u
 (wu,t)+ρtA















Now since   w(qt+1) > 0a n dρt+1 = 1. Then, (8)-(9) at t + 1 and (10) imply:
[u
 (wu,t+1)+A






  (   w(qt)).
Comparing the conditions in two successive periods we have
[u
 (wu,t+1)+A







  (   w(qt)).
Since   w(qt) <   w(qu,t+1), by convexity A  (   w(qt+1)) >A  (   w(qt)), φu,t+1 ≥ 0, and ρt ≤ 1i m p l y
that u (wu,t+1) <u  (wu,t). The result hence follows from the concavity of u. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5 (gradual promotions). The ﬁrst order conditions in each
period for wg and πg when ρt = 1 are (recall that
∂A (  w(qt))









37For the technical reader, notice that we are assuming that the Kuhn-Tucker constraint qualiﬁcations
are satisﬁed. A suﬃcient condition for the constraint qualiﬁcations is Slater condition for the existence of a
strict interior feasible contract.




Vt+1(πg,t+1,1) = φπ,t+1. (12)












Next, notice that when the type is revealed there is no social concerns since there will be no















  (   w(qt)),
and the result follows since when   w(qt) > 0t h e nA  (   w(qt)) > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6 (wage non-monotonicity). The fact that wu,t−1 <w u,t
follow from the proposition on wage compression. We show that wu,t+1 <w u,t.T h e ﬁrst
order conditions for workers of unknown type (8)-(9) at periods t imply that:
u
 (wu,t)+A




The next period envelope condition for an interior contract is:
u
 (wu,t+1)+ρt+1A







  (   w(qt+1)) = u
 (wu,t)+A
  (   w(qt)),
and the result follows again from ρt+1 ≤ 1, since   w(qt) <   w(qt+1), the convexity of A and
the concavity of u. Q.E.D.
30Appendix C: Properties of VT−t.
The conditional value functions. For any period t, consider a sequence of history-
dependent dummy variables ρt = {ρt+n(ht+n) | ht}
T−t
n=0, where ht+s is such that qt+s  = 1 for
the agent under consideration (notice that when q = 1 we can w.l.o.g. assume ρs (hs)=1 ) .
Notice that ρt is hence a deterministic vector of length T − t.D e n o t eb yΥt the set of all
possible ρt and by Vt(π,q,ρt) the solution to the general recursive problem in Section 3 when
the workers’ decisions correspond to ρt.I ts o l v e s
Vt(π,q,ρt)
=m a x
wu,wg,πu,πg (1 − pq)
 
u(wu) − ρtA(   w(q)) + Vt+1(πu,q u,ρt+1)
 
+ pq[u(wg)+Vt+1(πg,1)]
subject to [q],[u],[g]a n d[ π], where ρt+1 ∈ Υt+1 is the continuation of ρt.
Lemma 10 Vt(π,q,ρt) is concave and diﬀerentiable in π for any t, q and ρt.
Proof. By backward induction on the Bellman operator deﬁning Vt starting from
VT+1 (π,q,ρT) ≡ 0 it can be shown that the conditional function Vt is concave and con-





 (wt) − ρ
d
dwt
A(   w(q))
This is so since both u(·)a n d−A(·) are concave and diﬀerentiable, by the usual Benveniste
and Scheinkman (1979) perturbation argument, each conditional value function Vt is diﬀer-
entiable at any interior point (see also Stokey, Lucas and Prescott (1989); Theorem 4.10).
Q.E.D.
The upper envelope. We now describe the value function Vt as the upper envelope
of the conditional functions Vt(π,q;ρt)w ej u s td e ﬁned.
Lemma 11 The upper envelope function
Vt (π,q)=m a x
ρt∈Υt
Vt(π,q,ρt)( 1 3 )
always admits both right and left derivatives that satisfy:
V
+
t (π,q) ≥ V
−
t (π,q).
Moreover, this upper envelope is almost everywhere diﬀerentiable and, whenever the deriva-










t (π,q) maximizers of (13).
31Proof. Notice that we can apply directly the Daskin (1967) extended envelope theorem
to this problem. The key assumptions of the theorem are that (i) ∂
∂πVt(π,q;ρt)m u s tb e
continuous jointly in (π,ρt) for all q; and that (ii) the set Υt is compact for all t.T h i s i s
indeed the case since for any given ρt, ∂
∂πVt is continuous in π, and (since T<∞)t h es e t
Υt is a ﬁnite set for all t. For a restatement of the theorem, and simple proof, see Lemma
11 in Pavoni (2004). Q.E.D.
Lemma 12 In equilibrium, π will always be chosen so that Vt (π,q) is diﬀerentiable.
Proof. We know from the previous Lemma that V
+
t (π,q) ≥ V
−
t (π,q). If we can show
that V
+
t (π,q) ≤ V
−




t (π,q), and the result follows.
For interior contracts we can distinguish two cases. We restrict to ρ = 1 (the case ρ =0
follows mutatis mutandis). Notice that by monotonicity the budget constraint [π]i sa l w a y s
satisﬁed with equality.
Case 1. No participation constraint is binding
In this case, social concerns are not active, and the ﬁrm in period t maximizes
pq [u(wg)+Vt+1 (πg,1)] + (1 − pq)[u(wu)+Vt+1 (πu,q u)]
such that
pq(p − wg + πg)+( 1− pq)(pqu − wu + πu)=π.
When incentive compatibility constraints are not binding, ﬁrst-order conditions imply that
p − wg =
πg
T−t and wg = wu. With these expressions, and using the budget constraint, we
compute πg as a function of πu. The problem thus becomes a free maximization program
over the unique variable πu. At the optimum, the right derivative of the objective function
is smaller than the left derivative.
Case 2. Only the good-type workers participation constraint is binding.
We solve for wg as a function of πg from [g]. Then, using the budget constraint we are left
with two choice variables, πg and πu. The optimization program boils down to maximizing
pqV
m
t (k,1) + (1 − pq)[u(f1 (πg,πu)) − ρA(f2 (πg,πu)) + Vt+1 (πu,q u)]
The gradient must show a similar inequality and we are again done since both f1 and f2 are
diﬀerentiable since they are composite functions of diﬀerentiable functions. Q.E.D.
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